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Sammis: Community Property

Community Property and
Family Law
by Arthur M. Sammis*
Probably the most important development in the field of
community property law during the past year was the legislation affecting causes of action and damages for injury to
the person. Several cases dealing with integrated property
settlements are of importance in clarifying problems relating
to support provisions, modification, and enforcement. Developments in the case and statutory law dealing with the
parent and child relation have emphasized the continuing trend
toward liberality in the legitimation of children. Three major
areas in this field have received attention and are worthy of
comment. The conclusive presumption of legitimacy set forth
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in Evidence Code section 621 has been further strengthened
by judicial decision; two new cases and one new statute are of
importance in dealing with the problems of legitimation and
adoption, and there has been some clarification of the judicial
attitude toward artificial insemination and the numerous problems it presents.

Causes of Action and Damages for Injury to the Person
Prior to the enactment of Civil Code section 163.5 1 in 1957,
the California cases were uniform in holding the cause of
action for personal injuries, if arising during the marriage, to
be presumptively community property, and the damages which
it produced to have the same character. 2 The presumption
could be overcome by showing an agreement between the
spouses controlling the classification of the cause of action, 3
or by showing it arose when the property rights of the spouse
were within the coverage of section 169 of the Civil Code. 4
In addition, after acquisition of the cause of action its character could be changed by contract,5 and the community
classification of the action for damages for personal injury
automatically ended on termination of the community by death
or by divorce. 6 The primary difficulty with this concept of the
cause of action for personal injuries as community property
was its effect in cases involving contributory negligence by one
of the spouses. When the injured spouse was the wife, the
courts held that the community character of the action permitted the conduct of the husband, to the extent that it was the
1. Cal. Stats. 1957, Ch. 2334, providing: "All damages, special and general, awarded a married person in a
civil action for personal injuries, are
the separate property of such married
person."
2. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622,
248 P.2d 922 (1952); Zaragosa v.
Craven, 33 Ca1.2d 315, 202 P.2d 73, 6
A.L.R.2d 461 (1949).
3. Perkins v. Sunset Telephone &
Telegraph Co., 155 Cal. 712, 103 P.
190 (1909).
348
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4. Christiana v. Rose, 100 Cal. App.
2d 46, 222 P.2d 89 I (1950).
5. There is nothing in Kesler v.
Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254, 273 P.2d 257
(1954) in conflict with this. See Perkins
v. Sunset Telephone & Telegraph Co.,
155 Cal. 712, 103 P. 190 (1909) and
Zaragosa v. Craven, 33 Cal.2d 315, 202
P.2d 73, 6 A.L.R.2d 461 (1949).
6. Flores v. Brown, 39 Cal.2d 622,
248 P.2d 922 (1952); Washington v.
Washington, 47 Cal.2d 249, 302 P.2d
569 (1956).
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type of conduct constituting a defense to the cause of action, to
be imputed to the wife. 7
The reason underlying the imputation of the husband's conduct to the wife was the necessity of eliminating the possibility
that he would benefit from his own wrongful conduct since he
would have a community property interest in the damages recovered. The same rule and the same reason applied where
the injured party was the husband and the contributorily negligent spouse the wife, at least after 1927, when the interests of
both husband and wife were defined as "present, existing, and
equal."g Although the parties could contract between themselves as to the nature of the cause of action, such a contract,
when entered into after the cause of action arose, was insufficient to prevent the imputation of contributory negligence
where that defense existed. 9
Coincident with the enactment of Civil Code section 163.5
the legislature in 1957 directed the Law Revision Commission
to undertake a study "to determine whether an award of damages made to a married person in a personal injury action
should be the separate property of such married person." The
report and recommendation of the commission,IO which resulted in the 1968 legislation, points out quite clearly the
undesirable side effects of the provision that damages awarded
to a married person for personal injuries are separate property;
although the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence
based upon the community character of the damages recovered
was effectively abrogated, the cure was, in many respects,
far more dangerous than the disease. Obviously, the classification of "all damages, special and general," as the separate
property of the injured spouse went far beyond the situation
involving contributory negligence on the part of the other
spouse. Consider the case of the husband who recovers substantial damages against a negligent defendant for injuries
7. Contributory negligence, see McFadden v. Santa Ana, Orange & Tustin
St. Ry. Co., 87 Cal. 464, 25 P. 681
(1891), and a long line of cases culminating in Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Cal.2d 254,
273 P.2d 257 (1954).
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8. Cal. Civ. Code § 161a, Stats. 1927,
Ch. 265.
9. Kesler v. Pabst, 43 Ca1.2d 254,
273 P.2d 257 (1954).
10. Cal. L. Rev. Com. Rpts., Recom.
& Stud. 1966-67. pp. 1389-1402.
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suffered in an accident in which the wife was in no way involved. Substantial medical expenses may have been incurred
and compensated for in the award of special damages; if community funds were expended in payment of such expenses the
recovery nevertheless remained the separate property of the
husband and the community was not entitled to reimbursement. The earning capacity of the husband may have been
gravely impaired, not only during the period of hospitalization
but also in the future, and this is a major item in the award of
general damages. Although the earnings of the husband
(and his ability to earn) are a community asset, the damages
remained the separate property of the husband and the community had no interest therein. If they are the separate property of the husband, damages received for personal injuries are
subject to his unrestricted disposition either by inter vivos gift
or by way of testamentary act, and if he dies intestate the
share of the surviving spouse will not usually exceed one-half
and may be reduced to as little as one-third, as contrasted with
the right to inherit the whole of the community property. If
the husband, recognizing the inequities of the situation, decides to convert his separate property recovery into community property, both state and federal gift tax consequences
arise; if he retains the recovery as his separate property it
receives less favorable treatment at the time of his death.
The Law Revision Commission recommended a return to
the earlier law and the enactment of legislation again making
damages received by a married person for personal injuries
resulting from the conduct of a third party community property. It recognized certain inherent defects (in addition to
the doctrine of imputed contributory negligence) in the pre1957 law and suggested legislation to deal with them. It
proposed further that the original ailment, which produced
the drastic cure of Civil Code section 163.5, be dealt with
by providing that the negligence of one spouse does not bar
recovery by the other unless such concurring negligence would
be a defense if the marriage did not exist. (It is difficult
to understand why this simple remedy did not occur to the
legislators 'in 1957.)
350
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The commission's recommendation was accompanied by a
draft of the proposed legislation. New measures were proposed: first, an act to amend sections 146, 163.5 and 171a
of, and to add sections 164.6, 164.7, and 169.3 to, the
Civil Code, relating to married persons, including their community property and tort liability; second, a measure amending section 171 c of the Civil Code. The recommendation
was accepted and the legislation adopted as a package, with
the addition of an amendment to section 168 of the Civil Code
making community property personal injury damages subject
to the payment of debts contracted by either husband or wife
for the necessities of life furnished to them or either of
them while living together. l l

Effects of the New Legislation
(1) Civil Code section 163.5 has been amended so that
personal injury damages paid to a married person are separate
property only if they are paid by the other spouse. One of
the effects of section 163.5 as previously enacted was to eliminate the doctrine of interspousal immunity for personal torts;12
the liability of either spouse for personal torts, intentional
or negligent, causing injury to the other spouse is preserved
by the amendment, and the recovery is separate property of
the injured spouse. In all other cases the original rule applies
since the character of such damages as community property
is determined by section 164 of the Civil Code.
(2) The new Civil Code section 164.6 deals specifically
with the imputed contributory negligence problem. The old
rule, imputing contributory negligence from one spouse to
the other on the theory of the negligent spouse's participation
in the recovery as community property, is eliminated by providing directly that the negligence or wrongdoing of the other
spouse is not a defense in an action against a third party by
the injured spouse except in cases where such negligence or
wrongdoing would be a defense if the marriage did not exist.
11. Cal. Stats. 1968, Chs. 457, 458,
pp. 128-133.
12. Self v. Self, 58 Ca1.2d 683, 26
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Cal. Rptr. 97, 376 P.2d 65 (1962);
Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal.2d 692, 26 Cal.
Rptr. 102, 376 P.2d 70 (1962).
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(3) The new Civil Code section 164.7 deals with the
recovery of damages by one spouse for injury suffered through
the negligence, or wrongful act or omission to act, of the
other spouse and provides that community property may not
be used to discharge the liability of the tortfeasor spouse to
the other spouse until the separate property of the tortfeasor
spouse has been exhausted. The right of the parties to agree
to the use of community property in such a case is limited
to agreements entered into after the occurrence of the injury,
and subsection (c) reserves the right of the tortfeasor spouse
to rely on insurance liability policies which he may have even
though the premiums thereon may have been paid with community funds.
(4) Subsection (a) of the new Civil Code section 169.3
treats recovery for personal injuries to a married person in
the same manner that earnings and accumulations are treated
under Civil Code sections 169, 169.1, 169.2 and 175 and
makes it clear that such recovery is the separate property
of the injured spouse if it is received under the circumstances
paralleling those in the other sections. Subdivision (b) provides for a right of reimbursement in the event that the spouse
of the injured person has paid expenses incurred by reason
of the injury out of either separate property or community
property under his management and control.
(5) The amendment to section 171 a of the Civil Code
clarifies the liability of each of the spouses for injury or
damage caused by the other and limits recovery to the separate property of the spouse incurring the liability and to the
community property under his or her management and control. The most important effect of this amendment is the
clarification of the law relating to liability for torts of the
wife.
(6) The amendment to Civil Code section 171 c again
places under the control and management of the wife damages received as community property by her for personal
InJurIes. The language of the amendment, substituting the
phrase "community personal property" for the former word
"money," eliminates the uncertainty which previously existed
352
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concerning the nature of earnings and damages not received
in cash. It also makes it plain that the wife can control
earned wealth originally acquired as "money" and items purchased or earned by such wealth until it ceases to be a separately manageable item of community property. The husband
is given a right to use community property received as damages
to pay for expenses incurred by reason of the wife's personal
injuries, or to reimburse his separate property or the community property under his management and control in the event
that it has been necessary for him to advance payment from
such sources.
(7) As previously pointed out the amendment to section
168 of the Civil Code provides for the inclusion of community
property personal injury damages of the wife and the treatment of such damages in the same manner as earnings insofar
as liability for necessities is concerned.
(8) Certainly the greatest innovation embodied in the
1968 legislation is the special provision contained in the
amendment to Civil Code section 146, concerning the division of property received as personal injury damages on divorce or separate maintenance. Up to this point the statutory
"package" merely reinstates the concept of damages for personal injuries as community in character, eliminates the rule
imputing contributory negligence based solely on the nature
of the recovery, and makes certain corrective changes dealing
with the management of such recovery. As previously mentioned, in most cases the primary item of general damages
is the impaired earning capacity or loss of earnings of the
injured spouse. Obviously, if a divorce action is brought
shortly after the damages are recovered and they are treated
as regular community property and apportioned between the
parties, a substantial portion of the award may represent
the loss of earnings which would be received after the judgment of divorce or separate maintenance. The section as it
now stands provides that without regard to the ground on
which the decree is rendered or to which party the divorce
or separate maintenance is granted, community property personal injury damages shall be assigned to the party who suf23
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fered the injuries unless the court, after taking into consideration the economic needs of each party, the time that has
elapsed since the recovery of the damages, and all other facts
of the case, determines that the interests of justice require
another disposition. If the court so decides, it may assign
the community property personal injury damages to the parties
in such proportions as the court deems just under the facts
of the particular case. This creates a completely new form
of community property to be dealt with at the time of divorce
or the granting of a decree of separate maintenance, and
sets up a very different rule for its award than is applicable
in the case of the normal community property or quasi-community property. While this may raise a constitutional problem, it would seem that the unique nature of such property,
having as its source the compensation for injuries to one of
the spouses, is sufficient to sustain its separate classification.
Summary. The new legislation dealing with recovery for
personal injuries returned the status of such recovery to that
of community property, eliminated the doctrine of imputed
contributory negligence to the extent that the doctrine has
been predicated solely upon the community character of the
damages recovered, clarified the right of management and
control of property so received and its liability for debts
of the parties, and created a separate category for the treatment of such property upon divorce or separate maintenance.
The changes were badly needed and apparently have solved
the problems existing before 1957 as well as those created
by the enactment of Civil Code section 163.5 without creating
any serious difficulties. This does not mean that the problems
of the past have vanished; with the exception of the amendments to sections 168 and 171 c of the Civil Code (which
amendments apply only to "community property personal injury damages") all the provisions of the new legislation are
subject to the savings clause which provides that: "(t)his
act does not confer or impair any right or defense arising
out of any death or injury to personal property occurring
prior to the effective date of this act." Damages received
for personal injuries during the past eleven years are, to the
354
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extent that their character has not been changed by co-mingling
with community property or by agreement, the separate property of the spouse who received them. Further, causes of
action which arose before the effective date of the new legislation, but which have not yet been tried or settled, will result
in the acquisition by the injured party of an award which
is his or her separate property. Having once opened Pandora's
box, the evils which were released are not returned to confinement merely by closing the lid.
Integrated Property Settlements-Support Provisions; Modifications and Enforcement
The background of the law pertaining to integrated property settlement agreements, the modification and enforcement
of support provisions contained in such agreements, and the
1967 amendments to Civil Code section 139 have been previously discussed. 13 No cases under the 1967 law have as yet
reached the point of decision in the appellate courts, but
several recent cases under the old law deserve attention.
In Hecht v. Hecht 14 and in Tremayne v. Striepeke/ 6 the
court was concerned with the question of whether the provisions contained in an integrated property settlement agreement
were "support" provisions within the meaning of Civil Code
section 139. In both cases the agreements were entered into
during the period covered by the 1961 amendment to Civil
Code section 139, providing for the modification of provisions for support of the spouse contained in an integrated
property settlement agreement where there were minor children of the parties.
The agreement in Hecht was executed as of April 24, 1963,
and the agreement in Tremayne was executed on December
21,1961; in both cases there were minor children. In Hecht
the parties were unable to consummate a property settlement
during the pendency of the divorce action. They entered
13. See Cal Law Trends and Developments 1967, pages 113-117.
14. 259 Cal. App.2d 1, 67 Cal. Rptr.
293 (1968).

15. 262 Cal. App.2d 107, 68 Cal.
Rptr. 470 (1968).
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into a stipulation for support of the children, of the wife,
and otherwise effecting but not completing a disposition of
their property rights. Thereafter, an interlocutory decree of
divorce was granted to the wife which, among other things,
reserved to the court for its determination the issues of alimony, child support, and division of community property.
Final judgment of divorce was entered on August 31, 1962.
The wife remarried in September, 1962, and the husband remarried in October of that year. A property settlement agreement was finally executed April 24, 1963, and this settlement
was incorporated in haec verba into an order of the court
dated June 28, 1963. The agreement (and the court order)
provided for "alimony payments," and stated that such payments should not be modifiable by either party or the court,
that they should terminate only upon expiration of 121 months
from May 1, 1963, or upon the death of the wife, and that
they should not terminate upon the death of the husband or
upon remarriage of the wife. Further provision was made
for the payments to constitute a charge against the estate
of the husband if he pre-deceased his former wife within the
l2l-month period. The agreement was expressly stated to be
an integrated one, and both parties conceded that it was one
in fact.
The court, in deciding that this was not a provision for
"support" within the meaning of Civil Code section 139,
pointed out that alimony or support provisions for a wife
were not usually made in a settlement executed after the
wife has remarried. After discussing the general rules pertaining to alimony and support payments as arising primarily
from the marital relationship, and after pointing out that
one of the inherent characteristics of alimony is that it is
paid during a period in which a divorced wife remains unmarried and that payment thereof ordinarily terminates on
the death of either spouse, the court went on to state the
well-settled rule that when installment payments have been
made an integrated part of a settlement, although such payments may have been designated as alimony or support payments, they are nevertheless not alimony to the extent that
they represent a division of the community property itself,
356
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or constitute an inseparable part of the considerations of the
property settlement. The court then held that the payments,
provided to be paid under the terms of the agreement and
under the decree, were a contribution to division of property
rather than a substitute for marital support and that they
were therefore outside the scope of Civil Code section 139
as amended.
The court in the Tremayne case relied heavily upon Hecht.
In the latter case the parties had entered into a property
settlement agreement prior to divorce which contained provisions for support of the children, a division of the community
property and support of the wife. By virtue of the provisions
for support of the wife the husband committed himself to make
payments of $200 monthly (in two installments) which, as
the agreement expressly provided, "shall continue during the
joint lives of husband and wife and until wife shall remarry,
or they shall cease on the death of husband or on the death
or remarriage of wife." The interlocutory decree adopted
these provisions and the final decree made binding any and
all provisions in the interlocutory judgment. More than four
months after the entry of the final decree the parties entered
into a supplement to the original agreement which provided
that the payment of alimony should terminate 10 years and
30 days after the execution of the supplement, and that the
supplement as well as the original statement be deemed integrated and non-modifiable except by written agreement of the
parties or upon order of the court. One month later the
court made its order modifying the interlocutory and final
decrees and ordered the husband to pay the specified support
sums for the period stated in the supplement. Thereafter the
wife remarried and the husband ceased making support payments. The court concluded that these payments were not
"support" payments within the meaning of Civil Code section
139.
That there is a fundamental distinction between installment
payments, made directly as a part of the property division,
and provisions for support contained in an integrated property settlement agreement, which constitute an integral part
CAL LAW 1969
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of the consideration for the property settlement as a whole,
does not appear to have occurred to the court in Hecht. Obviously, if the obligation is of the first kind there is no integrated
agreement; the contract simply relates to the division of property and nothing more. Language in the Tremayne decision
indicates that the court may have really regarded the purported
support provisions as payments to be made as part of a nonintegrated agreement for division of property, despite the
express language stating the agreement to be an integrated one.
The court discusses the case of Hilton v. McNitt/ 6 with particular reference to the second decision in that case,I7 holding
that an ambiguous provision relating to payments for "support" was in fact a payment in lieu of property. If the provisions in Hecht and in Tremayne were ambiguous the decisions
would be justifiable. But it is difficult to ascertain whether
the courts in both cases were simply unaware of the nature
of an integrated property settlement agreement or decided
to narrow the application of Civil Code section 139 despite
the express language of the statute.
Another example of judicial gymnastics appears in Garrett
v. Garrett. IS The case also points up an adage well known
to the legal profession: "Never act as your own attorney
unless you want a fool for a client." The combination of the
two has resulted in a decision completely sound in its ultimate
result but absolutely weird in the path that was followed
to reach the decision, both by the court and by the unfortunate
defendant, who was also a respected member of the bar. The
problems inherent in the case were enhanced by the counsel
for plaintifi' wife who ultimately testified that he had advised
the court at the divorce hearing that the parties had entered
into a property settlement agreement but did not give the
agreement to the court to inspect because he wished the court
to retain jurisdiction to enforce by contempt the support
provisions.
The facts of the case are simple and the conduct of the
16. 49 Cal.2d 79, 315 P.2d 1 (1957).
17. 200 Cal. App.2d 879, 19 Cal.
Rptr. 688 (1962).
358
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parties in relation thereto might also be characterized by the
same term. They entered into an agreement which (as the
court properly found) was clearly integrated. The agreement contained a provision for payment of support for the
children and for the support of the wife until her death or
remarriage. The interlocutory decree of divorce contained
precisely the same provisions as did the property settlement
agreement concerning child custody, child support, and support for the plaintiff wife, except that the agreement characterized the latter payments as "support and maintenance" whereas the decree called for "alimony and support." The defendant agreed to permit the matter to go by default and did not
appear at the trial. The final judgment of divorce entered
in 1955 incorporated the provisions of the interlocutory decree
by reference, and in April of 1964 the court ordered the
former husband to show cause why he should not be adjudged
guilty of contempt for non-compliance with the alimony and
child support provisions of the interlocutory decree and the
final decree of divorce. The court did not hold him in contempt but ordered payment of substantial arrearages, attorneys' fees and nominal costs.
On appeal, the court confirmed the integrated nature of the
agreement and also held that there was no merger of the
property settlement agreement into the judgment of divorce.
In view of the fact that the trial judge had not even seen the
agreement, that it was not incorporated into the decree expressly or by reference, and that the decree did not purport
to order performance of the terms of the agreement, the
finding as to lack of merger is not only logical but indisputable. In discussing the jurisdiction of the court to determine
arrearages, reference is made to Bradley v. Superior Court,19
where it was held that contempt is not available as a remedy
to enforce either the wife or child support provisions of an
integrated property settlement agreement incorporated in the
divorce decree. Since the trial court in this case had not
imposed contempt, the relevance of the statement is somewhat
19. 48 Ca1.2d 509, 310 P.2d 634
(1957).
CAL LAW 1969
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dubious. But even more amazing is the statement which
follows it, to wit: "( t) he principle of the Bradley case is
not restricted to situations where the property settlement agreement has been merged or incorporated into the decree of
divorce, but applies where the issue of the validity of the
agreement has been previously presented to the divorce court."
If the decree of the court has not been substituted for the
agreement of the parties by way of merger it is somewhat
difficult to determine where the Bradley principle comes into
play. Subsequent language of the court in discussing the
general rules relating to the effect of judicial approval as
rendering the validity of the agreement res judicata is not
particularly helpful, although clearly correct. Nor does the
further discussion of the obvious fact that the trial court was
not empowered to modify or reject, without the consent or
acquiescence of the husband, the provisions for the support
of the wife contained in the integrated agreement shed much
light on the problem. However, at this point the defendant
comes to the rescue of the court and of the case; unfortunately,
his assistance was of benefit to everyone but himself. On
the face of the decree, over the signature of the defendant
husband, appeared the following statement: "Agreed to and
approved both as to form and contents." As pointed out
by the court, this statement was apparently signed prior to
the divorce hearing, and it was clear that the defendant intended that the support provisions be adopted by the court
notwithstanding the provisions of the integrated property settlement agreement. Accordingly, such payments were no longer
an integral part of the adjustment of property rights but were
severable, and the order of the court was not based upon an
integrated property settlement agreement whose provisions
were inseparably related to the provisions for division of property. For those who enjoy Alfred Hitchcock's stories, this
decision is recommended for late evening reading.
In the case of Davis v. Davis 20 the supreme court was
confronted with the question, as a matter of first impression,
20. 68 Cal.2d 290, 66 Cal. Rptr. 14,
437 P.2d 502 (1968).
360
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whether after the remarriage to each other of divorced parents
either may enforce against the other an order for child support made in a prior divorce proceeding. The peripatetic
nature of the husband's employment created problems; at
the time of the first divorce no order was made for support
of the children as the defendant had been served outside of
California by publication; subsequently, pursuant to the stipulation of the parties, an order for child support was made.
Thereafter the parties remarried each other and several months
later again separated. Plaintiff wife instituted a second divorce action in California but, since the defendant was then
employed in the oil fields in Iran, he was again served by
publication and again the divorce decree did not provide
support payments for the children. Upon his return to California the parties again stipulated that a court order could
be made for child support, and a second order was duly
made. The defendant complied with this order. The mother
then sought to collect child support payments for some 36
months between the separation that followed the remarriage
and the second support order and relied upon the support
order entered in the first divorce action.
Could she recover? No. If the parties again intermarry
child custody and support orders as between themselves are
thereupon terminated, as is the jurisdiction of the court to
enforce such orders. This is true whether or not the parents
subsequently divorce again. The incidence of remarriage
of divorced couples is low enough in itself, but when there
is added to it the time lag here involved it seems doubtful that
many cases will require the application of the rule laid down
in Davis.
May a person ordered to make support payments be held
in contempt when he does not make them because he does
nov have the ability to make the payment in full but is capable
of paying a lesser amount? Yes, said the supreme court, in
Lyon v. Superior Court,I sustaining the lower court and
reversing the district court of appeal. The reason? After
1. 68 Ca1.2d 446, 67 Cal. Rptr. 265,
439 P.2d 1 (1968). For further dis-

cussion of this case, see
EDIES, in this volume.

YORK,
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considering the cases cited by the defendant, the court states:
". . . . nothing in any of those cases is authority for the
proposition that a court may not render a contempt adjudication for failure to make support payments in a specific
amount, even though smaller than those ordered, if the party
did not have the ability to pay in full the amount ordered."
If carried to its logical extreme the reasoning in this case
practically eliminates the defense of inability in contempt
proceedings. In a society which is both affluent and oriented
in the direction of social welfare, it would be very difficult
to find a father who would not be able to pay something. Must
a father, faced with adversity and completely unable to pay
the full amount required by the support order, be faced with
the additional problem of second-guessing a court as to the
amount he is "able" to pay?
Civil Code section 139.7 provides: "An order for payment
of an allowance for the support of one of the parties pursuant
to Section 139 shall terminate at the end of the period specified
in the order and shall not be extended unless the court in its
original order retains jurisdiction."
What is the meaning of "original order"? The only logical answer is that given by the court in Maben v. Superior
Court. 2 In its original order the trial court ordered the defendant to pay the plaintiff $600 per month as alimony and
this was subsequently reduced to $485 per month. Thereafter, on the defendant's order to show cause, the court modified the prior support order as follows: "Defendant is ordered
to pay to plaintiff for her support and maintenance for 12
months $250 a month commencing January 1, 1966, and
continuing for 11 months thereafter at which time alimony
shall terminate." The husband fully complied with the provisions of this order. All orders were silent as to continuing
jurisdiction to modify. On January 13, 1967 (after full compliance by the defendant husband with the last order of the
court ordering payment for support and maintenance for 12
months) the wife obtained an order requiring defendant to
2. 255 Cal. App.2d 708, 63 Cal. Rptr.
439 (1967).
362
CAL LAW 1969

http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/callaw/vol1969/iss1/14

16

Community Property and Family Law
Sammis: Community Property

show cause why he should not be required to pay $600 per
month as alimony in the future. The husband moved to dismiss on the grounds that the court no longer had any jurisdiction to grant the relief sought.
Upon denial of the defendant's motion and upon setting
of the order to show cause, the husband filed his petition for
writ of prohibition. The appellate court looked to the digest
of the bill by which section 139.7 was adopted which read,
". . . . termination of alimony payments. Adds section
13 9.7, Civ. C. Provides that alimony payments shall terminate as provided in the order for support of the party unless
that order provides for their extension." The legislative intent
is clear and, as applied to the instant case, the statutory language referred to the last order made by the court for limited
alimony. Obviously the court had jurisdiction to modify the
earlier orders which provided for payments for an indefinite
period of time; it did not retain any jurisdiction to modify
the last order after the expiration of the time limited therein
for payment. As the court phrased it, ". . . . the legislature intended to provide that the obligation of one party to
pay for the support of the other party pursuant to section 139
shall terminate at the end of the period specified in the latest
order and shall not be extended unless the court in that order
expressly retains jurisdiction."
Paternity and the Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy

At common law, a child born to a married woman was
legitimate unless there was evidence to show that the husband
was:
1. Incompetent. 2. Entirely absent, so as to have no
intercourse or communication of any kind with the
mother. 3. Entirely absent, at the period during which
the child must, in the course of nature, have been begotten. 4. Only present under circumstances as afford
clear and satisfactory proof that there was no sexual
intercourse. S
3. Hargrave v. Hargrave, 9 Beaver
552, 50 Eng. Rpt. at 458 (1846).
CAL. L.AW 1969

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1969

363

17

Community Property and Family Law
Cal Law Trends and Developments, Vol. 1969, Iss. 1 [1969], Art. 14

California Evidence Code, section 621 4 provides: "Notwithstanding all other provisions of law, the issue of a wife,
cohabitating with her husband, who is not impotent, is conclusively presumed to be legitimate."
The California statute includes the first two common-law
tenets, though "incompetent" has been changed to "impotent"
and the "cohabitating" is used to incorporate the second.
A number of cases, beginning with Estate of McNamara,5
follow the third common-law tenet to create an exception to
the statute. In McNamara a wife deserted her husband and
lived continuously thereafter with another man. 304 days
after her change of partners she gave birth to a son whom
nobody, including the court, regarded as her husband's child.
McNamara stated the rule: ".
the conclusive presumption must be limited to cases where the husband has
had intercourse with the wife during the normal period of
conception."6 Therefore, as at common law, the conclusive
presumption does not apply unless conception occurs during
cohabitation.
The common-law rule of the conclusive presumption of
legitimacy has been followed without exception. The statute,
modified by the McNamara doctrine, has also been followed,
although two apparent judicial exceptions exist. A medically
sterile husband escaped the conclusive presumption of the
paternity of his wife's child in Hughes v. Hughes7 by a process
of reasoning which essentially equated sterility with impotency.s The 1967 case of Jackson v. Jackson 9 opens one
avenue leading to possible avoidance of the conclusive presumption, based on blood test evidence, despite previous legis4. Cal. Stats. 1965, Ch. 299. Formerly Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. § 1962,
subd. (5).
5. 181 Cal. 82, 183 P. 552, 7 A.L.R.
313 (1919).
6. 181 Cal. at 95, 183 P. at 557, 7
A.L.R. at 322.
7. 125 Cal. App.2d 781, 271 P.2d
172 (1954).
364
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8. When the statute was enacted,
medical operations to produce sterility
were virtually unknown, the concept
hardly recognized. The common law
"incompetent" simply meant lack of
ability to procreate. The Hughes case
follows the common law.
9. 67 Cal.2d 245, 60 Cal. Rptr. 649,
430 P.2d 289 (1967).
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lative action,lO and an affirming judicial decision,tl which
refused to alter the statute to include results of blood tests.
In Jackson, the husband was permitted to introduce blood
tests indicating his non-paternity of the child only in order
to introduce further evidence to place himself within the
McNamara rule. 12 The Jackson case creates an exception to
the statute only if the husband can account for all his wife's
time.
Neither the common law nor the statute relieves the husband
of the effect of the conclusive presumption if his wife has
intercourse with another man and conception occurs during
marital cohabitation. That the husband may not be the
biological father is totally immaterial. This was made clear
in the first cases to apply the statute and is dramatically
illustrated in the recent case of Hess v. Whitsett. 14 In this
case, it was clear that Luther Whitsett, a Negro, was the natural
father of Kathy Hess, a child described by the court as having
"chocolate colored skin." The child's mother, a Caucasian,
admitted having intercourse with Whitsett over a two-month
period during which time she was cohabitating with her husband, also a Caucasian. Regardless of these facts, the statute
clearly applied: the husband was neither impotent, absent,
10. Cal. Evid. Code §§ 890-896,
formerly Cal. Code of Civ. Pro. §§
1980.1-1980.7, is the California version
of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to
Determine Paternity. When the statute
was enacted, the legislature specifically
excluded section 5 of the Uniform Act
which provides: "The presumption of
legitimacy of a child born during wedlock is overcome if the court finds that
the conclusions of all the experts, as
disclosed by the evidence based upon
the tests, show that the husband is not
the father of the child."
11. Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal.2d 603,
7 Cal. Rptr. 129, 354 P.2d 657 (1960).
12. This he did by showing that the
couple cohabitated less than four days,
that they were together continuously
during that time, and therefore, as

shown by the blood tests, conception
could not possibly have occurred during
cohabitation.
13. In Estate of Mills, 137 Cal. 298,
70 P. 91 (1902), Diana and Roland
Chatham cohabitated, i.e., lived together as husband and wife within the
same household, and as a "normal"
family, with one exception. After 1862,
Roland never had intercourse with his
wife; she never had intercourse with
anyone but the family boarder, Robert
Mills, whose bed and bedroom she
shared. Nevertheless, the two children born after 1862 were held to be
legitimate children of the husband, and
denied any share of the Mills estate.
14. 257 Cal. App.2d 552, 65 Cal.
Rptr. 45 (1967).
CAL LAW 1969
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nor practicing abstinence; therefore he was Kathy's legal father
and she his legitimate daughter.
A major problem confronting the court in Hess was the
statement in McNamara that the conclusive presumption was
subject to a "racial difference" exception. 15 The court, pointing out that the language was dictum, concluded, "The doctrine of stare decisis does not apply to dictum
( and)
there is no sound basis for the judicial creation of a
racial difference exception.,,16
The effect of the conclusive presumption is to make it
impossible to show that a child who is conceived by a married
woman while the latter is cohabitating with her husband is
illegitimate. Evidence Code section 621, modified only by
judicial acceptance of the limitations contained in the commonlaw rule on which it is based, has been once again reinforced.
Legitimation and Adoption

The ease with which legitimation of an illegitimate child
can be accomplished by adoptionI7 is emphasized by the
recent case of Estate of Maxey.Is Bill Maxey and Nettie
Hunt met in 1935, and their son, Harry, was born a year
15. 181 Cal. at 96, 183 P. at 557558, 7 A.L.R. at 323: "There is one
class of cases where it is recognized,
in this country at least, that the husband
is not to be taken as the father of the
child, even though he had intercourse
with his wife during the normal period
of conception. That instance is where
the husband and wife are of the same
race, as for instance white, and it appears that the wife has had intercourse
with a man of another race, as for instance a Negro, and the child is of
mixed blood. (Citations.) The reason
why the conclusive presumption is not
applied in such instances is that the element of indeterminability which is the
reason for the presumption in the ordinary case is absent. It is clear that the
husband is not the father. The actual
366
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fact, in other words, is capable of definite determination, and for this reason
the conclusive presumption which is a
substitute for such determination is not
properly applicable."
16. 257 Cal. App.2d at 556, 65 Cal.
Rptr. at 48.
17. Cal. Civ. Code § 230: Adoption
of illegitimate child. The father of an
illegitimate child, by publicly acknowledging it as his own, receiving it as
such, with the consent of his wife,
if he is married, into his family, and
otherwise treating it as if it were a
legitimate child, thereby adopts it as
such; and such child is thereupon
deemed for all purposes legitimate from
the time of its birth.
18. 257 Cal. App.2d 391, 64 Cal.
Rptr. 837 (1967).
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later. Nettie refused to marry Bill, but listed his name on
the birth certificate. It was not clear when Harry took the
Maxey name, but Bill acknowledged the child as his own in
Oklahoma and later in California after the parties had married
others and had moved to this state. Bill visited Harry about
every six months for several years, once asked that Harry
be permitted to spend the summer at the Maxey home (permission was refused), and on another occasion addressed
Harry as "son." Upon Bill's death the court ruled that Harry
was entitled to letters of administration in preference to Bill's
former "wife," his brothers or sisters, or the public administrator because he was a legitimate child within the meaning
of Civil Code section 230.
Perhaps there was further contact between father and son,
perhaps Bill Maxey contributed to Harry's support, perhaps
he made more than the token efforts toward Harry's upbringing
apparent from the opinion. Probably not. Nevertheless,
Harry was a legitimate child, fully entitled to all rights thereof.
Problems in the area of adoption received attention from
both the legislature and the courts in 1968. Subsection (b)
was added to Civil Code section 222, providing: "If the
court is satisfied that the adoption of a child by a stepparent
is in the best interest of the parties and is in the public interest,
it may approve such an adoption without regard to the ages
of the child and such adoptive stepparent. "19
Literally construed, this section could result in children of
earlier marriages being adopted by subsequent spouses younger
than the children!
Civil Code section 232.5 20 was added in 1965 to liberalize
existing custody rules granting preferential treatment to natural parents over third parties. In the first case to consider
this section, Adoption of Neal/ the child had been left with
an aunt and uncle for several years. The natural father had
failed to communicate with the child for over six months
19. Cal. Stats. 1968, Ch. 568, p. 365.
20. Section 232.5: Cal. Stats. 1965,
Ch. 1064. "The provisions of this chapter shall be liberally construed to serve
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and protect the interests and welfare
of the child."
1. 265 Cal. App.2d - , 71 Cal. Rptr.
300 (1968).
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and had made only token payments toward his support. In
reversing the decision of the lower court denying the petition
of the aunt and uncle in an abandonment proceeding to have
the child declared free of parental custody, the appellate court
pointed out that upon a new hearing of the petition the provisions of Civil Code section 232.5 must be liberally applied.
The rule prior to the adoption of that section limiting the
inquiry solely to whether the child had been abandoned within the meaning of section 701 of the Welfare and Institutions
Code [the predecessor of Civil Code section 232] is no longer
law, and the making of a wise selection between the natural
parent and a third party is now a duty imposed upon the court.
Artificial Insemination

Artificial insemination is the medical process which enables
a couple, otherwise unable to have children, to achieve pregnancy by means of a surgical injection of the wife with semen
obtained from a third party donor. This procedure has
caused complicated legal problems until recently.
In the first case to raise the issue, the courts were so startled
and hostile to the new concept that they called it "adultery."
Unanswerable questions resulted. If it was adultery by the
woman-the donee-would· it not also be adultery on the
part of the donor? If so, when? If at the time of the donation, what if the semen was never used? If at the time of
injection, and the donor had died (semen so collected is often
frozen for use at a later date) the donee would not only be
guilty of adultery but also necrophilia. Perhaps the doctor,
rather than the donor, should be the adulterer? If the doctor
were a woman, the result would be a child conceived by two
females. Absolve both the donor and the doctor from adulterous guilt? Then the woman would commit unilateral adultery, or if she injected the semen herself, self-adultery!
By the time the matter had reached the appellate court
level, no reference was made to "adultery," but the decisions
(all from an intermediate New York appellate court) were
confused and conflicting. Allowing the husband visitation
368
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rights, one case 2 held the child conceived by artificial insemination not illegitimate because ". . . . the child has been
potentially adopted or semi-adopted."3 A later case4 found
the child "not the legitimate issue of the husband"5 but nevertheless ordered him to support the child because his consent
in writing to the artificial insemination constituted an implied
contract to do so.
People v. Sorenson,s a unanimous decision by the California
supreme court, is the first logical and comprehensive judicial
comment on the matter. When Lois and Folmer Sorenson
were divorced, Lois declared she wanted no support award
for their son, Christopher, who was conceived by artificial
insemination to which Folmer had consented in writing. The
court ordered no support payments but retained jurisdiction
in the matter. When Lois later became too ill to work, she
applied to the Sonoma County Welfare Department, which
provided assistance but requested Folmer to contribute to
Christopher's support. He refused and was convicted of willful failure to provide for a minor child in violation of California Penal Code section 270. In affirming that decision,
Justice McComb, writing for the court, reasoned that: "(If)
. . . . a husband who, unable to accomplish his objective
of creating a child by using his own semen, purchases semen
from a donor and uses it to inseminate his wife . . . proof
of paternity has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.,,7
Since the only issue before the court in Sorenson was the
matter of child support, no determination was made on legitimacy, but the court left no doubt that it would rule in favor
of legitimacy when the opportunity arises.
The legislature took only a few weeks following Sorenson
to add to Civil Code section 196b: 8 "The husband of a woman
2. Strnad v. Strnad, 190 Mise 786,78
N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948).
3. 190 Misc. at 787, 78 N.Y.S.2d at
391.
4. Gursky v. Gursky, 39 Misc.2d
1083, 242 N.Y.S.2d 406 (1963).
5. 39 Misc.2d at 1088, 242 N.Y.S.2d
at 411.
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6. 68 Cal.2d 280, 66 Cal. Rptr. 7,
437 P.2d 495 (1968). For further discussion of this case, see Collings, CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, in this vo1ume.
7. 68 Cal.2d at 286, 66 Cal. Rptr.
at 12,437 P.2d at 500.
S. Cal. Stats. 1968, Ch. 235, p. 5.
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who bears a child as a result of artificial insemination shall
be liable for support of the child in the same manner as if
he were the natural father, if he consented in writing to the
artificial insemination."
Additional legislation is necessary because courts cannot
formulate details and regulations concerning a medical technique which is constantly growing more popular. A suggested
model might be similar to a 1967 Oklahoma statute,9 the
only comprehensive legislation passed to date. Combining
regulations well established by the medical profession with
existing adoption laws, the Oklahoma statute specifically
makes the child conceived by artificial insemination the legitimate child of the husband consenting to the use of the process.
The husband, the wife, and the physician must all sign the
documents, and they must be approved by "the judge having
jurisdiction over adoption of children." (The last phrase
makes it clear that payment of legal fees will be required of
couples wishing to use the technique.)
Hopefully, similar legislation can be enacted in California
to end such legal confusion and conflict over artificial insemi9. Oklahoma Statutes Annotated,
Title 10 §§ 551-553:
§ 551. Authorization
The technique of heterologous artificial insemination may be performed
in this State by persons duly authorized
to practice medicine at the request and
with the consent in writing of the husband and wife desiring the utilization
of such technique for the purpose of
conceiving a child or children. Laws
1967, c. 305, § 1.
Ii 552. Status of child
Any child or children born as the
result thereof shall be considered at law
in all respects the same as a naturally
conceived legitimate child of the husband and wife so requesting and consenting to the use of such technique.
Laws 1967, c. 305, § 2.
§ 553. Persons authorized-Consent
No person shall perform the tech370
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nique of heterologous artificial insemination unless currently licensed to practice medicine in this State, and then
only at the request and with the written consent of the husband and wife
desiring the utilization of such technique. The said consent shall be executed and acknowledged by both the
husband and wife and the person who
is to perform the technique, and the
judge having jurisdiction over adoption
of children, and an original thereof shall
be filed under the same rules as adoption papers. The written consent so
filed shall not be open to the general
public, and the information contained
therein may be released only to the persons executing such consent, or to persons having a legitimate interest therein
as evidenced by a specific court order.
Laws 1967, c. 305, § 3.
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nation as still remains after Sorenson. Until it is, Sorenson
has at least served to clarify two previously unanswered problems: the identity of the father of a child conceived by artificial insemination, and his resulting financial responsibility for
the child.

*
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